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COMPULSORY WHEELING OF ELECTRIC
POWER TO INDUSTRIAL CONSUMERS
NICHOLAS W. FELS* and
DAVID N. HEAP**
INTRODUCTION
HIS Article briefly addresses the compulsory transmission, or
" wheeling," of power from the standpoint of the industrial con-
sumer. The subject is one that seems to arise with increasing frequency
as industrial users, faced with sharply increased rates at the hands of
their local utilities, consider cheaper, albeit more distant, sources of
supply.
Typically, an industrial consumer locates a source of power that is
cheaper than the power available from the local utility that has
traditionally served it-indeed, so much cheaper as to be advanta-
geous even with the costs of the additional transmission taken into
account. This situation will arise if (1) the industrial consumer gener-
ates electricity at one site, notably by cogeneration,' that it wishes to
use at another site, or (2) the consumer wishes to purchase cheaper
power from a supplier whose lines do not reach the purchaser's plant.
To date, the wheeling of power directly to industrial consumers in
either situation has been extremely rare.2 Because the local utility in
particular would often find a wheeling arrangement less remunerative
than a direct sale to the user, that utility may refuse to wheel the
cheaper power. The resulting conflict of economic interests raises the
issue whether a utility may be compelled to wheel power to an indus-
trial consumer.
Part I of this Article reviews the regulatory context of wheeling:
who has jurisdiction over particular facets of a wheeling transaction
* B.A. 1964, Harvard College; LL.B. 1968, Harvard Law School; Member,
New York, California, and District of Columbia Bars; Partner, Covington & Burl-
ing, Washington, D.C. This Article is based upon a paper delivered by Mr. Fels to a
symposium of the Electricity Consumers Resource Council in Washington, D.C. on
April 22, 1983.
** B.S. 1974, Brigham Young University; J.D. 1979, J. Reuben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University; Member, District of Columbia Bar; Associate,
Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
1. Cogeneration refers to the use of energy sequentially. A boiler may raise
steam, for example, first to produce electric power and then to provide thermal
energy. See 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (1982).
2. See A. Holmes, A Review and Evaluation of Selected Wheeling Arrange-
ments and a Proposed General Wheeling Tariff 1, 47-48 (Sept. 1983) (unpublished
FERC staff working paper) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
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and what substantive standards apply. Part II discusses the grounds
upon which an unwilling utility might be compelled to wheel power
in the circumstances described above.
I. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Wheeling and Sales Rates
1. The Wheeling Rate
Under section 201 of the Federal Power Act (FPA or Act) ,3 the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) has
jurisdiction over the "transmission of electric energy in interstate com-
merce,"'4 except for transmission by instrumentalities of federal, state
or local governments.5 All electric utilities in the continental United
States now are, or are in the process of being, physically intercon-
nected. As a result, virtually all transmission of power by investor-
owned utilities is deemed to be "in interstate commerce" and subject
to FERC jurisdiction, even if the transmission is between two points
in the same state. 6
Section 205 of the FPA requires the utility to file a service agree-
ment or tariff covering the wheeling with the FERC at least sixty days
before it is to take effect.7 The rate included therein is then subject to
suspension for up to five months after the effective date" and to
adjustment under sections 205 and 206 if it is found not to be just and
reasonable or to be unduly preferential or discriminatory. 9 A just and
3. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1982).
4. Id. § 824(b). The Act does not, however, grant jurisdiction to the FERC over
facilities used in local distribution or for the transmission of energy consumed wholly
by the transmitter. Id. But see infra note 6 and accompanying text.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 824(f) (1982).
6. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 456-64 (1972); FPC v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 206-16 (1964); Fairman & Scott, Transmis-
sion, Power Pools, and Competition in the Electric Utility Industry, 28 Hastings L.J.
1159, 1177 (1977); Tiano & Zimmer, Wheeling for Cogeneration and Small Power
Production Facilities, 3 Energy L.J. 95, 106 (1982). Certain systems in Texas have
been ordered to interconnect with out-of-state systems pursuant to §§ 210, 211 and
212 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i, 824j, 824k (1982), and are not
subject to the FERC's jurisdiction under § 201(b), id. § 824(b). See Central Power &
Light Co., Docket Nos. EL79-8, E-9558, 17 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,078, at 61,170
(1981), modified on other grounds, 18 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,100 (1982); cf. West
Tex. Utils. Co. v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 470 F. Supp. 798, 814 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(intrastate defendants did not violate federal antitrust laws by refusing to intercon-
nect with interstate utilities because Congress gave utilities a choice between intra-
state and interstate operation).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (1982). Some utilities have on file at the FERC general
wheeling tariffs stating the terms and conditions under which they will wheel. If a
particular service is undertaken pursuant to the tariff, it can commence without an
additional prior filing. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.1(c) (1983).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1982).
9. Id. §§ 824d(e), 824e(a).
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reasonable rate under the Act is one that allows the utility to recover
its costs, fixed and variable, including a reasonable return on invest-
ment.' 0 The FERC has severely limited the extent to which the wheel-
ing utility can calculate its charge simply by taking a "percentage
adder" based on the purchase price of the power to be wheeled.'" The
rates that a utility files with the FERC to cover a wheeling service
must be cost-based and must satisfy traditional criteria of rate base,
cost-allocation and return.'2
In addition, the Commission generally bases rates on the utility's
average, rather than incremental, transmission costs.1 3 Accordingly, it
has held that the rate base for transmission services should be deter-
mined by taking into account virtually all of the transmission facilities
of the wheeling utility, on the premise that the utility is operationally
integrated. ' 4 The Commission will not normally segregate out that
portion of the transmission system actually used to perform the wheel-
ing.'5
2. The Sales Rate
Section 201(b) gives the FERC jurisdiction over wholesales (sales for
resale) in interstate commerce, but not over sales directly to the
consumer.' 6 Thus, in a wheeling arrangement involving a direct sale
from a remote supplier to an end user, with intermediate transmission
by one or more third parties, the federal government would not
regulate the sales rate. Rather, the state in which the sale occurs may
regulate such rates.' 7
10. See Anaheim v. FERC, 669 F.2d 799, 803-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Nepco Mun.
Rate Comm. v. FERC, 668 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1117 (1982); 18 C.F.R. § 35.12(b)(2) (1983); Note, Title I of PURPA: The Effect of
Federal Intrusion into Regulation of Public Utilities, 21 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 491,
498-99 (1979).
11. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.23 (1983) (limiting percentage adder to costs incurred by
the utility as a result of a transmission or purchase and resale transaction, not
including the purchase price of the power or costs recovered under another rate
component).
12. See supra note 10; see also Florida Power & Light Co., Docket Nos. ER77-
175-000, ER78-19-000, 21 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,070, at 61,240 (1982) (utility's
wheeling rates reasonable because they represent fully allocated costs).
13. See New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., Docket No. ER82-410-000, slip op. at
5-6 (FERC Nov. 7, 1983); Missouri Util. Co., Docket Nos. ER77-354, ER78-14, 10
FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,297, at 61,599 (1980).
14. Missouri Util. Co., Docket Nos. ER77-354, ER78-14, 10 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,297, at 61,599 (1980); see Public Serv. Co., Docket No. ER82-141-000, 22
FERC Rep. (CCH) 63,083, at 65,268-69 (1983), aff'd, 24 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,007 (1983); Public Serv. Co., 56 F.P.C. 3003, 3034-35 (1976).
15. See Public Serv. Co., 56 F.P.C. 3003, 3035 (1976).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1982).
17. See 1 A. Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation 31 (1969).
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When the entire transaction-sale, transmission and use-occurs
within a single state, that state's law governs the retail sales rate. If,
however, the power is wheeled from a seller in one state to a user in
another, the outcome is less clear. Presumably, the question will turn
on where, under the sales contract, delivery from the generating
utility to the industrial consumer occurs. The public utility commis-
sion of the state where such delivery occurs would have the authority
to set the rate if state law so provides.' 8
As a practical matter, an electric utility is not likely to be enthusias-
tic about making a sale in which delivery occurs in another state.
First, the seller may thereby become subject to the jurisdiction of the
state commission in the buyer's state. Additionally, the state commis-
sion in the buyer's state has no reason to be solicitous of the seller's
economic well-being, and may therefore be inclined, if it regulates the
sale, to be more restrictive with respect to the allowable rate.
B. Prior-Approval Requirements
The Federal Power Act does not require that a regulated entity
obtain approval before undertaking a transmission service that is
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. The wheeling utility need
only file the tariff or rate schedule under which it proposes to wheel at
least sixty days before beginning service. 9 Moreover, because trans-
mission in interstate commerce is under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the FERC, a state would presumably be precluded from requiring
local utilities to obtain state commission approval before undertaking
to wheel.20
18. Indeed, an attempt by a state to regulate the rate for sale and delivery of
power in another state would likely be found unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution. See United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275,
279, 282 (2d Cir. 1982) (invalidating attempt by Connecticut to regulate out-of-state
wholesale price of beer), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 265 (1983); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (commerce clause precludes state regulation of com-
merce that takes place wholly outside of state borders, regardless of whether com-
merce has effects within the state).
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. Until recently, it had been assumed that states simply lacked the authority to
regulate transactions that § 201 of the FPA places under FERC jurisdiction. See Utah
v. FERC, 691 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1982) (a state may not compel a utility to
discontinue an interstate wholesale for which a tariff has been accepted and ap-
proved by the FERC). The basis for that view was the Supreme Court's 1927 holding
that sales at wholesale in interstate commerce lay beyond the states' regulatory reach,
even in the absence of any federal regulation of such sales. Public Utils. Comm'n v.
Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927). In Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp.
v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1905 (1983), however, the Supreme
Court stated that wholesales of electricity in interstate commerce over which the
FERC lacked jurisdiction were not necessarily beyond the states' power to regulate.
[Vol. 52
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Whether the sale (as distinct from the related transmission) to the
end user requires prior approval from state authorities will depend,
however, on the law of the state that regulates the sale. If delivery
occurs in the state in which the power is generated, and as is common,
public utilities within that state are subject to the jurisdiction of the
state commission, 21 the commission might be able, consistently with
the United States Constitution and the FPA, to prevent the sale from
going forward. 22 The result may be the same even without a formal
requirement of state commission approval. A selling utility is unlikely
to undertake a significant sale to an out-of-state customer if it believes
that its own state commission, with which it must deal on a day-to-
day basis, may disapprove. Moreover, a state commission would not
be expected to look favorably upon a sale to an industrial consumer,
particularly an out-of-state consumer, at rates that are lower than the
rates prevailing on the selling utility's own system. To the contrary,
the state commission is likely to require, or at least encourage, the
selling utility to price the power on an incremental basis. 23 Thus, by
either directly or indirectly controlling the ability of a utility to sell
low-cost power beyond state borders, a state commission may effec-
tively decrease the probability that an industrial consumer will find
out-of-state power available at a bargain price. Nevertheless, if the
rates in the selling utility's state are lower than those prevailing in the
consumer's state, relatively cheaper power may be available.
II. COMPULSORY WHEELING
If an industrial consumer is successful in acquiring low-cost power
from a remote source (generated by the consumer itself or another
utility), it is likely to meet resistance from its traditional supplier. The
supplier will normally be reluctant to lose a significant customer, and
its lines may provide the only economically practicable path for trans-
mitting the power to the buyer's plant. Other utilities standing be-
Id. at 1912-13. The Court upheld the authority of a state to regulate certain whole-
sales between a cooperative financed by the Rural Electrification Administration and
the cooperative's member distributors, all of whom were located within the state. Id.
at 1908, 1913. In so doing, the Court blurred the wholesale/retail dichotomy in
regulation as it had been understood since Attleboro.
21. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 46-3-12 (1982); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111 2/3, § 8
(West Supp. 1983-1984); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.040 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
22. But see New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 335, 344
(1982) (State prohibition against exporting hydroelectric power produced within
state when power is reasonably required for use within the state violates the Com-
merce Clause).
23. Incremental costs are the added costs incurred by the selling utility in making
the sale. Since utilities normally put their lowest-cost generating resources to use first,
incremental costs will typically exceed average system costs.
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tween the distant supplier and the plant may also decline to wheel,
even though they have the capacity to do so.
The question then arises whether those utilities can be compelled,
either directly or indirectly, to transmit the power. A number of legal
grounds that might support such compulsion must be considered.
A. Section 203 of PURPA
Section 203 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA)2 4 provides the FERC with the authority, upon application
by a utility, federal power marketing agency or geothermal power
producer, to direct another utility to wheel. 25 The conditions attached
to this authority, however, make it almost useless to industrial users
seeking to import cheaper power from a distant source. The Commis-
sion's order under section 203 may not compel "the transmission of
electric energy directly to an ultimate consumer. 26 Thus, the leg of
transmission that is least likely to be provided voluntarily, the final leg
to the plant, is the one that section 203 cannot secure. There must be
more than one utility's transmission facilities intervening between the
selling utility and the consumer for section 203 to be effective.
Section 203 also imposes several other conditions: First, the wheel-
ing sought must "conserve a significant amouat of energy, . . . signifi-
cantly promote the efficient use of facilities and resources, or ...
improve the reliability of any electric utility system. '127 Mere cost
savings to the consumer do not suffice. Second, the wheeling sought
must not be "likely to result in a reasonably ascertainable uncompen-
sated economic loss for any electric utility, . . . place an undue bur-
den on an electric utility, . . . [or] impair the reliability . . . [or]
ability of any electric utility . . . to render adequate service to its
customers. '28 A local utility could assert that the loss of a major
industrial customer would constitute an "uncompensated economic
loss." Third, the wheeling order may not issue unless the FERC finds
that it would "reasonably preserve existing competitive relation-
ships. '29 The legislative history makes clear that this provision encom-
passes relationships "among utilities in competition with one another
for the same customers." 30 Moreover, the Commission has held that
this condition forbids the compelling of wheeling where to do so
24. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 203, 92 Stat. 3117, 3136-38 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 824j (1982)). Section 203 amended the Federal Power Act by adding a new
§ 211(a).
25. Id. § 824j(a).
26. Id. § 824j(c)(4).
-27. Id. § 824j(a)(2).
28. Id. § 824k(a).
29. Id. § 824j(c)(1).
30. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 7797, 7826.
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would permit a remote seller to take even a small share of the whole-
sale market now served by the wheeling utility.31 Finally, the FERC
order may not compel wheeling "which is inconsistent with any State
law which governs the retail marketing areas of electric utilities."' 32 As
a result, exclusive local franchisees may not be ordered under section
203 to wheel power into their franchise areas.3 3 These provisions
further reduce the likelihood that section 203 could be invoked to
advantage by an industrial customer seeking to import low-cost
power. 3
4
B. Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA
Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA forbid not only unjust and unrea-
sonable rates, but also unreasonable differences in services and unduly
discriminatory or preferential practices.35 If a utility is wheeling on
behalf of other utilities (or perhaps on behalf of one industrial user),
its refusal to wheel to, or on behalf of, another industrial user, not-
withstanding its physical capacity to do so, might constitute such a
forbidden practice.
Whether such a refusal is actionable under the statute is unclear. In
1973, the Supreme Court stated that nothing in Part 1136 of the FPA
(regulating electric utilities engaged in interstate commerce) enabled
31. See Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 25 FERC Rep.
(CCH) 61,204, at 61,530-32 (1983).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(c)(3) (1982).
33. Franchises are generally granted by cities or counties pursuant to statute.
See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 46-3-4 (1982); Iowa Code Ann. § 478.1 (West Supp.
1983-1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 80.32.010 (1962); Hjelmfelt, Exclusive Service
Territories, Power Pooling and Electric Utility Regulations, 38 Fed. B.J. 21, 21
(1979). Apart from authorizing the issuance of franchises as such, state law may
proscribe any utility from serving a customer already served by another utility, unless
the latter gives its consent. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:123 (West 1982); cf.
American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 25 FERC
Rep. (CCH) 63,075 (1983) (interpreting reference in wheeling agreement to since-
repealed "anti-pirating" provision in Ohio statute).
34. Perhaps because of its narrow terms, there has been little litigation under
§ 203. In Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 25 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,204, at 61,539-40 (1983), an application to compel wheeling was denied on the
ground that wheeling would permit the distant seller to take a portion of the
wholesale market of the wheeling utility, thus failing to preserve existing competitive
relationships. Id. at 24. Central Power & Light Co., Docket Nos. EL79-8, E-9558,
17 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,078, at 61,170 (1981) (utilities must construct facilities to
effect interconnection pursuant to § 203), modified on other grounds, 18 FERC Rep.
(CCH) 61,100 (1982), is the only other reported case under § 203.
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a),(b), 824e(a) (1982).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824k (1982). Part I of the Act, id. §§ 791-823a, concerns
hydroelectric licensing, FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 22 (1952), and has
been held to enable the Commission, as a condition of such a license, to compel the
licensee to wheel, see id. at 22-24.
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the Federal Power Commission, the predecessor of the FERC, to
compel wheeling. 37 Consequently, the Commission has refused to
order a utility to wheel as a means of curing "undue discrimination"
on the part of the utility. 38 The Second Circuit has reached the same
conclusion, treating section 203 of PURPA as the sole basis upon
which the Commission may order wheeling. 39
The Commission might nevertheless employ sections 205 and 206 of
the FPA to compel wheeling indirectly. If a utility were wheeling on
behalf of some persons, but declined to extend the same service to
others, the Commission might, upon the appropriate showing of un-
due discrimination, order the utility to eliminate that discrimina-
tion. 40 In theory, the utility could cure the discrimination by simply
discontinuing its existing wheeling operations. Such a result would
likely be precluded by the utility's contractual obligations to those on
whose behalf it is already wheeling. Thus, the only way that the
utility could comply with the Commission's order would be to extend
wheeling service to the complaining party.
Although the Commission has never actually issued such an order to
eliminate discrimination in wheeling, it has indicated that it might do
so in an appropriate case. 41 One FERC administrative law judge,
37. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375 (1973). The Court
based its holding in part on the legislative history of Part II of the Act, which was
originally drafted to include a duty to wheel. Id. at 374. The Court noted that
"[t]hese provisions were eliminated to preserve 'the voluntary action of the utilities.' "
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1960)). The FPC had earlier
reached the same conclusion. City of Paris v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 41 F.P.C. 45, 49
(1969).
38. New England Power Pool Agreement (NEPOOL), 56 F.P.C. 1562, 1585
(1976), aff'd sub nom. Groton v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 50 F.P.C. 1479, 1481 (1973). The Commission has recently indi-
cated a willingness to reexamine its authority to order wheeling to remedy anticom-
petitive conduct. While noting that its authority to do so was "not entirely clear,"
Southeastern Power Admin. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 25 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,204,
at 61,538-39 (1983), the Commission stated:
It is argued that by virtue of owning the only transmission lines to the
municipals Kentucky possesses monopoly power and that it has exercised its
monopoly power by refusing to wheel SEPA's power and energy to the
municipals. These arguments ... might be relevant in a proceeding
brought under sections 205 and 206 of the Power Act and might, on a
proper record, justify us in ordering Kentucky to wheel.
Id. at 21.
39. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 638 F.2d 388, 400-403 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has ruled to the same
effect. Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 678 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 800 (1983).
40. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
41. See New England Power Pool Agreement (NEPOOL), 56 F.P.C. 1562, 1585
(1976), aff'd sub nom. Groton v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
Commission stated:
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however, has subsequently held that only customers who are already
being offered wheeling services by the utility are entitled to relief for
undue discrimination by that utility.42 The judge noted that discrimi-
nation cannot be used as a means of compelling the utility to wheel for
new customers because electric utilities are not common carriers. 43
Two commentators have reached the same conclusion, reasoning that
the voluntary nature of wheeling transactions precludes indirect com-
pulsion through discrimination claims. 44 Another commentator has
argued at length to the contrary, reasoning that because the statutory
scheme is aimed at abusive and monopolistic practices, "the duty to
consider antitrust policy entrusted to the agency would seem to de-
mand the 'generous construction of its statutory authority.' "45
In any event, proving "discrimination" or "undue preference" will
be difficult in most circumstances. The mere fact that a utility is
already wheeling for one utility or industrial consumer does not neces-
sarily establish that its refusal to wheel for another violates the statu-
tory standard. 46 The likelihood of securing relief would be diminished
further if the utility were to advance operating or capacity consider-
ations to justify disparate treatment. Grounds for an FERC order "to
eliminate the discrimination" may therefore be established only if a
utility wheels to or on behalf of one person, refuses to wheel to or on
behalf of another, and has no sound explanation for the differing
treatment other than the utility's own private interest in retaining the
latter as a retail customer. 4
7
As an additional prefatory matter we also emphasize the Supreme Court's
statement in Otter Tail Power . . . that the Commission has no authority
under Part II of the Federal Power Act to order wheeling. Of course to the
extent that any provision of the NEPOOL Agreement is discriminatory or
unduly preferential so as to violate Sections 205(b) and 206(a), a separate
issue is presented. In the present procedural context of NEPOOL and specif-
ically in relation to the issue of firm power transmission, if assuming ar-
guendo the Commission found discrimination in the wheeling provision, it
could not as a remedy order additional wheeling, but it could order that the
discrimination be eliminated.
Id.
42. Florida Power & Light Co., Docket No. ER78-19, 12 FERC Rep. (CCH)
63,014, at 65,051 (1980), modified on other grounds, 21 FERC Rep. (CCH)
61,070 (1982).
43. Id.
44. See Tiano & Zimmer, supra note 6, at 98.
45. Reiter, Competition and Access to the Bottleneck: The Scope of Contract
Carrier Regulation Under the Federal Power and Natural Gas Acts, 18 Land &
Water L. Rev. 1, 52 (1983) (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
776 (1968)).
46. See Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
47. Cf. Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d 668, 679 (5th Cir. 1981)
("[I]n the absence of findings of specific anticompetitive activities ... the Commis-
1983]
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C. Cogeneration-Section 210 of PURPA
The FERC is authorized, under section 210 of PURPA, 4s to promul-
gate special regulations for the wheeling of power produced by a
"qualifying cogeneration facility" or a "qualifying small power pro-
duction facility," as such facilities are defined in section 201 .4 These
facilities are sources of power whose development was deemed by the
Ninety-fifth Congress to be particularly worthy of government en-
couragement. 50 Under section 210, a utility is required, in specified
circumstances, to purchase power from such facilities at rates not to
exceed the utility's incremental costs for alternative power ("avoided
costs") determined by the FERC's rules.51 Moreover, the cogenerator
or small power producer may compel any electric utility to buy its
power; the obligation to purchase is not limited to the closest utility.52
The Commission, however, has adopted a rule under which a utility
that would otherwise be required to purchase power from a qualify-
ing facility may discharge its obligation, with the consent of the
qualifying facility, by wheeling the power to another utility.-3 The
recipient utility must then purchase the power from the qualifying
facility at the avoided-cost rates established by the Commission's
rules.54
This form of compulsory wheeling does not benefit an industrial
user that cogenerates at one plant and wants to use its cogenerated
power at another plant if the local utility that serves the recipient
sion is without authority . . .to compel wheeling."), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 800
(1983).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
49. Id. § 796(17)-(18). A qualifying cogeneration facility "produces ... electric
energy, and... steam or forms of useful energy (such as heat) which are used for
industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes." Id. § 796(18) (A). A qualifying
small power production facility produces electric energy "solely by the use, as a
primary energy source, of biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal re-
sources, or any combination thereof." Id. § 796(17)(A)(i).
50. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 97-99, reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7797, 7831-33.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1982); see 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303, 292.304 (1983). The
FERC's rules with respect to avoided costs were upheld by the Supreme Court in
American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1921, 1933
(1983).
52. See 45 Fed. Reg. 12,220 (1980). If the qualifying facility does not desire the
utility with which it is directly interconnected (the "first utility") to purchase the
cogenerated electricity, but prefers that a utility interconnected with the first utility
(the "second utility") purchase the power, it may sell the cogenerated power to the
second utility only with the consent of the first utility. If the first utility refuses to
wheel to the second utility, the first utility remains obligated to purchase the power
from the qualifying facility at avoided-cost rates. Id.
53. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(d) (1983).
54. Id.
COMPULSORY WHEELING
plant refuses to wheel. The FERC's rule for cogenerated and small-
facility power only enables an industrial consumer to compel that
utility to buy the power at avoided cost.
The indirect benefits from the FERC's rule, however, may be
tantamount to what would be gained from compulsory wheeling. By
making a compulsory sale to the utility with the highest avoided cost
(net of any transmission charges) and then purchasing power from the
local utility under its existing rates, an industrial consumer may reap
economic benefits equivalent to having consumed its own cogenerated
power. Alternatively, by threatening to compel the local utility serv-
ing the recipient plant to buy cogenerated power at the FERC-speci-
fied rate, the industrial user may be able to induce that utility to
undertake "voluntary" wheeling.
D. Antitrust Implications
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,55 the Supreme Court held
that the refusal by Otter Tail to wheel power on behalf of two
municipal utilities was both an attempt to monopolize and an actual
monopolization of the local distribution of power in violation of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.56 The municipalities had taken over Otter
Tail's distribution facilities in their respective areas after its franchises
had expired, and although lacking any generation capacity of their
own, had power available to them from the United States Bureau of
Reclamation. 7 The only way to get that power into their systems,
however, was through Otter Tail's transmission facilities, and Otter
Tail refused either to sell power to the municipalities or to wheel the
power from the Bureau of Reclamation. 5 Moreover, Otter Tail en-
gaged in what the trial court found to be obstructive litigation in-
tended to prevent competitors from entering the market.59
It cannot be assumed that the Court's conclusion in Otter Tail
would apply in an action by an industrial customer against its local
utility under the Sherman Act if the customer showed nothing more
than the availability of cheaper power from a remote source and the
defendant's refusal to wheel that power to the plaintiffs plant. First,
the plaintiff would have to establish that the recalcitrant utility did in
fact possess monopoly power over the relevant market that includes
the industrial customer's plant, involving a factual inquiry to define
55. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
56. Id. at 368. Although the Court recognized that Part II of the FPA precludes
the Commission from ordering a utility to wheel, id. at 374, it stated that the
Commission's limited authority did not immunize Otter Tail from antitrust regula-
tion for refusals to deal, id. at 374-75.
57. Id. at 370-71.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 372.
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the relevant market and calculate the utility's market power therein.60
Second, allowing an industrial consumer to compel its local utility to
wheel whenever a cheaper source of power is located could expose
residential and other captive customers on high-cost systems to even
higher rates, insofar as these customers would have to bear a larger
share of the system's fixed costs. On the other hand, in the longer
term, the loss of such a large-volume customer could diminish the
need for new and more expensive generating facilities, thereby reduc-
ing the fixed costs per unit for the system as a whole.6' The effect of
wheeling on other customers was not addressed in Otter Tail.6 2
These and other considerations notwithstanding, the decisions in
this area are few, and the antitrust basis for compelling wheeling
remains largely undefined. 63 Certainly, there is no case law that flatly
precludes a plaintiff from prevailing on a Sherman Act theory in the
circumstances considered above. Moreover, section 4 of PURPA in
particular makes clear that section 203, the compulsory wheeling
provision, does not diminish the relief available under the antitrust
laws. 64
60. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369-70 (1973);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Byars v. Bluff City
News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 849-50 (6th Cir. 1979).
61. This effect is discussed, with respect to competition for wholesale customers,
in Pace & Landon, Introducing Competition into the Electric Utility Industry: An
Economic Appraisal, 3 Energy L.J. 1, 29 (1982).
62. In Otter Tail, the Supreme Court noted that the "promotion of self-interest
alone does not invoke the rule of reason to immunize otherwise illegal conduct," 410
U.S. at 380 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375
(1967)), in response to Otter Tail's argument that its conduct was necessary to
prevent Otter Tail from "go[ing] downhill." Id. The Court also stated, however, that
it did not suggest, in making the determination that the antitrust laws have been
violated, that a court must be "impervious" to assertions that "compulsory intercon-
nection or wheeling will erode [the utility's] integrated system and threaten its
capacity to serve adequately the public." Id. at 381. On the factual record before it,
the Court affirmed the district court's finding that Otter Tail's claims of erosion were
unsupported. Id.
63. For a recent decision granting a preliminary injunction against a utility's
refusal to wheel during the pendency of antitrust litigation, see City of Chanute v.
Kansas Gas. & Elec. Co., 564 F. Supp. 1416, 1424-26 (D. Kan. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-1818 (10th Cir. June 24, 1983). Decisions in which alleged refusals
to wheel were not remedied include: Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
692 F.2d 307, 314 (3rd Cir. 1982) (utility refusing to wheel lacked monopoly power);
City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 926, 932-33 (2d
Cir. 1981) (insufficient proof of refusals of specific, as opposed to general, wheeling
requests); Town of Massena v. Niagara-Mohawk Power Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 63,526, at 76,810, 76,812 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (no unconditional refusal to
wheel-engineering and technical concerns remained unresolved); Borough of
Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343, 1354 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(plaintiffs never specifically requested wheeling).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982).
Nothing in this Act or in any amendment made by this Act affects- (1) the
applicability of the antitrust laws to any electric utility or gas utility (as
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E. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
License Conditions
Under section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act, 65 the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC) may impose certain conditions in connec-
tion with the granting of a construction permit for a nuclear power
plant if it has found, after consulting with the Attorney General, that
"the activities under the license would create or maintain a situation
inconsistent with the antitrust laws."6 6 Although, on its face, section
105(c) does not add any substantive rights to those available under the
antitrust laws, the mere fact that a utility may suffer extended and
costly delays in putting a planned nuclear plant into operation while
an antitrust issue is being litigated before the NRC may make it
advantageous for an industrial customer to press a specific wheeling
claim before the NRC. 67 Indeed, a large number of NRC licensees and
permittees have accepted conditions under which they are obligated
to wheel for others.6 8
defined in section 3202 of title 15), or (2) any authority of the Secretary or of
the Commission under any other provision of law (including the Federal
Power Act [16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.] and the Natural Gas Act [15 U.S.C. 717
et seq.]) respecting unfair methods of competition or anticompetitive acts or
practices.
Id. The conference report applies this principle to wheeling: "Specifically with
regard to certain authorities to order interconnections and wheeling under title II, it
is not intended that the courts defer actions arising under the antitrust laws pending a
resolution of such matters by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission." H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 7797, 7802; see Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 660 F.2d
668, 676 n.20 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 800 (1983); Sunflower Elec.
Coop., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 603 F.2d 791, 800, 801 (10th Cir. 1979).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1976).
66. Id. § 2135(c)(5). For most purposes under the Act, a "construction permit is
deemed to be a 'license.' " Id. § 2235.
67. In that respect, § 105(c) contrasts with § 204 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824c
(1982), at least as construed by the FERC. Section 204 requires a public utility to
obtain the consent of the FERC prior to issuing certain securities. In Gulf States
Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973), the Supreme Court held that, in making its
decision, the Commission must consider allegations of anticompetitive conduct on
the part of the issuing utility. Id. at 762. In Gulf States, those antitrust allegations
included certain refusals to wheel. Id. at 752. Subsequently, however, the FPC
determined that, notwithstanding the Court's decision, it would bifurcate contested
§ 204 proceedings so that the securities could be issued even while the allegations of
anticompetitive conduct were being litigated. Gulf States Utils. Co., 50 F.P.C. 1945,
1948 (1973), modified on other grounds,* 53 F.P.C. 1259 (1975). The allegations
would simply be treated as if contained in a complaint under § 306 of the FPA. Id.
The result is that, unlike the case of NRC enforcement proceedings, an objection
based upon allegedly anticompetitive conduct will not hold up the utility's business
operations.
68. See Reiter, supra note 45, at 78.
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On the other hand, to the best of the authors' knowledge, none of
the licenses issued to date has obligated the recipient to wheel directly
to an industrial customer. Rather, those conditions concern wheeling
among electric utilities. As a practical matter, moreover, few utilities
are presently seeking NRC construction permits for new nuclear
plants. 69 It is the processing of the application for authority to con-
struct, rather than the construction or ongoing operation under the
license, that gives rise to the statutory antitrust review. 70 Only rarely,
then, will the NRC procedure be available to an industrial customer.
F. State Commission Orders
Finally, an industrial user may seek to compel its local utility to
wheel through its state commission, which has the most pervasive
control over the utility's operations.7 ' Industrial consumers that par-
ticipate in retail rate proceedings will be particularly familiar with
the agency's procedures, and the agency may be attuned to the needs
of a large power user that contributes substantially to the state econ-
omy.
This approach, however, presents jurisdictional problems. As noted
earlier, transmission of power "in interstate commerce" is subject to
regulation by the FERC, 72 and efforts by states to regulate activity
within the Commission's jurisdiction have been unsuccessful.73 More-
over, in section 203 of PURPA, Congress has defined the specific
conditions under which wheeling may be compelled. 4 If, as some
courts have held, PURPA represents the only ground upon which the
FERC can order wheeling,75 then any state commission order to the
same effect would logically be precluded.
There may, however, be indirect means by which the state commis-
sion's powers can be invoked to compel wheeling. In particular, if a
69. Id.
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (2) (1976). It should be noted, however, that after the
sponsor of the plant has completed construction, the plant must be licensed by the
NRC before operation can begin. Id. At the licensing stage, new antitrust conditions
may be added on the basis of changed circumstances. Id. Furthermore, there are
procedures for the NRC to consider allegations that a utility, once licensed, has
violated its license conditions. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (1983). Mere pendency of enforce-
ment proceedings, however, would not impede the construction or operation of the
plant.
71. See A. Priest, supra note 17, at 31-32.
72. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
73. See Utah v. FERC, 691 F.2d 444, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1982); Consolidated
Edison Co., Docket No. ER81-183-000, 15 FERC Rep. (CCH) 61,174, at 61,405
(1981). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
74. See supra pt. II(A).
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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state commission is persuaded that a utility's refusal to wheel had left
transmission capacity idle, the commission could refuse to impose the
resulting costs upon the utility's retail sales customers. 76 Those costs
would, in effect, be imposed upon the utility's shareholders in the
form of a reduction in revenues. The prospect of such action by the
state commission might serve as inducement for a utility to wheel.
CONCLUSION
Except for section 203 of PURPA, which has extremely limited
practical application, there are no well-defined methods of securing
involuntary wheeling. There are, however, available theories-nota-
bly, monopolization under the Sherman Act, and to a lesser extent,
discrimination under the Federal Power Act-that, although undevel-
oped in the context of compulsory wheeling, merit examination by
industrial consumers seeking to secure such wheeling.
76. Cf. Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
[Current State Looseleaf] Util. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,101 (Sept. 22, 1983) (affirming
state commission order reducing utility's purchased power expense because utility's
purchase of power from its corporate parent was an abuse of managerial discretion in
light of the availability of alternate, more economical supplies of electricity).
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